Vietnam’s Bureaucratic ‘Revolution’ Falls Short of True Reform – The Diplomat

Vietnam has just concluded a debt traditional lunar New Year’s Day to go “revolution“Institutional reforms intended to simplify the party apparatus. Just before the holidays, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) approved simplifying the plan the government filed. The next and last step of this revolution is that the National Assembly under the supervision of a party will organize an extraordinary session, expected 12. to 17 February to nominally execute a plan.

According to approved proposalThe government will transfer its institutional framework to 14 ministries and three agencies; At the same time there will be 13 general departments, 738 departments and bureau, and 3,303 subspecies eliminatedand 201 units for public services will be dissolved. Over 100,000 State civil servants will in principle be released and removed from state agencies. On the eve of worrying in society, and especially the frustration of employees who are likely to affect the simplified program, top leaders and governments have leaders invited the victims From the staff and the party members and claim that this revolution has achieved unity and very high consensus in the party and society, although they have not provided convincing evidence.

However, although the CPV Politbiro and the Central Committee focused on the revolution of the operating apparatus, which means the micro-or medium level, they seem to have forgotten or overlooked the decision-making appliance or the CPV structure of the power of the macro level. This is an extremely sensitive and challenging issue because it includes concentration and control of strength, and a special incursion of power balance between fractions. The balance of power is a “CPV mode” of insurance of unity and cohesion within the party; He was even crucial to the survival of CPV.

Here, the power structure at the macro level refers to the four highest position positions, colloquially known as “four pillars”: the position of the president of the party (during the time of HO Chi Minh) or the Secretary General (after HO’s death) and the posts of the President, the Prime Minister, and President of the National Assembly. Although the authorities are easily different from third and fourth positions, the boundaries between the first and the second position are sometimes blurred, especially lately.

CPV statutes stipulate that the Secretary General is the head of the party and the chairman of the central military commission who controls the army. In the meantime, the Constitution, recently changed in 2013, stipulates that he is the president of the State Head and the Chief Commander of the Armed Forces, but was placed under the leadership of the party. In practice, the Secretary General of the Persons with the highest national authority. This leads to the perception that the position of the president is only solemnly and that he lacks real power.

This perception seems to be further reinforced in the 12th mandate of CPV (2016-2021) and the current 13th term, where in many cases the Secretary General at the same time operated as actually the head of the state. For example, Lama Secretary General directly held telephone conversations with several state bosses including US President Donald Trump and Chinese leader XI Jinping. In December, he also visited a national visit to Malaysia and, along with the Prime Minister of the host, upgraded Bilateral relationships with a comprehensive strategic partnership. These are all diplomatic activities at the state level, the function the president is a constitutional mandate for performing.

CPV had previously had a political project Renew the Vietnamese political system during the 2001-2010 period, which included the proposal of the Secretary General to serve as president at the same time. However, the project was not executed because it was “It’s not the right time yet. “One of the questions asked at the time, who would have enough prestige and quality to hold both positions at the same time?

In October 2018, after the sudden death of President Tran Dai Quang, Nguyen Phu General General, General, at the same time assumed the role of the President until April 2021. Although the trong branded this “”situational“Decision and at the same time issued a warning about the concentration of too much power in any individual, CPV Central Committee to the National Assembly unanimously supported This decision, looking at it as in accordance with Global political practices.

Last year, Lam was in the same situation as the trong 2018. In August was selected Secretary General after Tong’s Sudden death in July. Three months earlier, Lam was chosen president. And so for about three months, Lam has led a series of bilateral and multilateral diplomatic activities as President and Secretary General of the CPV. This is something that no previous CPV leader has done since Vietnam launched Doi Moi in 1986.

The current “revolution” of the Vietnamese political system is a favorable moment for the CPV heading to the parallel revolution in the structure of the power of the party level. Can the dissolution and move to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the majority of the Central Commission for Foreign Relations, an agency originally responsible for the diplomatic activities of the Secretary General and the Politbiro Politbiro members, to be a step towards realization long -lasting A political project in which the Secretary General will simultaneously perform the duty of the head of the state?

The challenge is not about the empowered individual, but the way the power is controlled and how the office holder can be considered responsible. If “is not the right time” yet in the early 2000s, when will the time be the right time? The more delayed the execution of this project is, the more dilemma, which CPV faces in domestic politics and international relations. CPV now has a choice to take the project, whether now or after the 14th Congress of 2026. Of course, both the Constitution and the CPV Statutes must be modified before this may happen. Until then, institutional and political reforms of Vietnam will be incomplete and the central government will not be able to give an example to follow the roots of the rice.