Redefining the Belt and Road Initiative in Latin America – The Diplomat

Ahead of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s state visit to Brazil in November, China reportedly pushed for Brazil to formally join the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). In the end, the Brazilian government refused to sign the official document, but instead offered “establish synergies” with BRI.

Brazil cautious approach accession to the BRI reflects a nuanced balance between strategic pragmatism and the economic gains that define its foreign policy. In Latin America, intergovernmental rhetoric about a growing global south often meets the harsh realities of economic negotiation. Brazil is an example of this careful calculation of maximizing economic profit while maintaining autonomy. Factors such as the relationship with China, the trade balance with China, the regional role alongside India and the potential trade conflict between the United States and China influence the view.

Brazilian Agreement on project cooperation under the BRI, without formal membership, demonstrates its aspiration for strategic autonomy in a multipolar world. Instead of committing to the BRI as other Latin American nations have done, Brazil will align Chinese investments with domestic priorities, particularly those that strengthen Brazil’s agricultural and industrial competitiveness. By leveraging this cautious engagement, Brazil maintains control over the terms of its partnership with China, seeking not only economic benefits but also a greater balance of power in its international relations.

From China’s perspective, Brazil’s selective engagement reflects a broader trend of adaptability in its Latin American strategy. Although full support for the BRI would advance Beijing’s strategic goals in the region, Brazil’s reserved approach has led China to show greater flexibility, adapting BRI principles to meet Brazil’s specific economic and political needs. Through targeted investments that respect Brazil’s strategic autonomy, China can continue to make significant progress in Latin America’s largest economy, expanding infrastructure, connectivity and trade. Xi’s state visit in Brasilia in November supported this adaptive approach and his statements that The relationship between China and Brazil is in its “best period in history” and the “most beautiful chapter” of Sino-Brazilian relations is yet to come, adds goodwill to their dynamics.

Since its establishment in 2013, the BRI has been a driver of global connectivity and economic integration, particularly through investments in transport, energy and telecommunications. Across Latin America, 22 countries have formally joined the BRI – 13 in Central America and the Caribbean and nine in South America – yet Brazil remains outside the country along with Mexico, Colombia and the Bahamas. President Lula da Silva’s administration has signaled that while Brazil is open to cooperation, formal membership in the BRI would require significant trade and investment access from China. This position is consistent with Brazil’s broader foreign policy, emphasizing strategic autonomy and balanced partnerships.

Despite China’s continued interest in official approval, the Brazilian government has shown restraint, prioritizing a more predictable approach to Chinese markets, particularly for high-value agricultural exports such as animal protein. China’s recent goodwill gesture to end its anti-dumping measure on Brazilian chicken has been well received in Brazil and could open further discussions on technical trade barriers in areas such as sanitary standards.

This can be considered a long-term strategy to increase Brazil’s bargaining power. Confirming the BRI without securing concessions would weaken Brazil’s influence. Instead, a restrained stance allows Brazil to seek terms that strengthen its economic position and trade independence without creating unsustainable dependencies.

The strategic importance of Brazil for China cannot be overestimated. As China’s largest trading partner in Latin America, Brazil exported nearly $90 billion in goods to China in 2022, primarily oil, iron ore, and soybeans—commodities that make up about 75 percent of Brazil’s exports to China. Yet despite this volume, Brazil remains frustrated with its meager 5 percent market share in China and its position as the seventh largest importer. Brazil wants more market diversification for high-value exports such as beef, poultry and pork.

During his Visit in 2023 In Beijing, Lula strengthened diplomatic ties, signing several bilateral agreements to improve trade facilitation and research cooperation. However, in 2023 and again this year, the Brazilian president withheld official support for the Belt and Road Initiative, instead framing the BRI as a flexible framework that can be adapted to the different needs of partner countries.

China’s response to Brazil’s selective engagement highlighted the adaptability of the BRI as a flexible project-based platform rather than a rigid membership structure. China’s willingness to accommodate Brazil’s demands illustrates a strategic approach that prioritizes substance over formality, emphasizing flexibility in project selection, investment objectives and market access. By prioritizing Brazilian interests – such as infrastructure development, animal protein exports and technological cooperation – China recognizes that emerging markets are seeking tailored partnerships that reflect their economic and national agendas.

This adaptive stance reflects a significant evolution in China’s foreign policy approach, one that seeks to cultivate sustainable relationships by meeting countries where they are. China’s continued interest in Brazil’s renewable energy, telecommunications and agricultural sectors, even without the need for BRI membership, demonstrates a response strategy that emphasizes mutual benefit rather than strict alliance. This flexibility also serves China’s interests as Brazil approaches a potential reevaluation of its position ahead of Xi Jinping’s return visit in 2025 at the BRICS summit. Respecting Brazil’s selective engagement reinforces China’s image as a cooperative power that values ​​sovereignty—a necessary position, given the political dynamics of Latin America.

Brazil’s careful strategy underscores its ambition to use any potential BRI support for greater market access, particularly in high-value sectors where it competes with the European Union and the United States. The opportunity for China to increase access to fast-growing markets for Brazil’s animal protein, leather, pulp and fruit would diversify Brazil’s trade relationships and reduce its dependence on raw commodities. Brazil is likely to demand guarantees to reduce technical trade barriers in exchange for any token approval of the BRI, helping Brazilian companies expand beyond primary exports into high-potential segments of the Chinese market.

Expanding market access for Brazilian products and reducing trade barriers would be a major political victory for Lula as he approaches his 2026 re-election campaign. Securing favorable trade terms with China could improve Lula’s domestic standing, showing that his administration is engaging with China on its own terms. without jeopardizing Brazil’s autonomy.

Moreover, the push to recognize the BRI could bolster China’s support for Brazil’s long-running campaign for a permanent seat on the reformed United Nations Security Council, a goal Lula has pursued since his first term. Official approval could become a significant bargaining tool in UN reform discussions, allowing Brazil to realize one of its key foreign policy ambitions while further cementing its partnership with China.

For China, securing Brazil’s formal support would symbolize a critical victory in the face of geopolitical opposition to the BRI from the United States and Europe. Failing that, however, Brazil’s example could signal to other developing countries that BRI membership is not a prerequisite for meaningful cooperation with China, reinforcing Beijing’s narrative of the BRI as a flexible and globally inclusive initiative.