Post-Martial Law, How Will South Korean Politics Play?

The irony of Yoon Seok-yeol’s downfall is that, for all his domestic unpredictability and poor political judgment at home, he was far more stable in foreign policy and steered South Korea on a path that understood new global realities.

This may be the reason why declaring a state of war it has so confused South Korea’s allies and adversaries. The start and end of the state of emergency was so quick that the US and Japan had no time to react other than sending prayers in their thoughts and declarations that they were aware of the situation.

North Korea itself did not react for several days until it finally did made a statement this condemned Yoon’s unstable nature and his dictatorial tendencies, and caused mass opposition to rally against him. He played down the importance of the state of emergency itself, since North Korea was essentially under a state of emergency since its foundationand he did not otherwise try to take advantage of the situation.

After his impeachmentYoon’s powers have been suspended, but he can only be removed from office if the Constitutional Court upholds the charges. Regardless of the court’s decision, Yoon’s days as president are numbered. Given the dysfunctionality of the People Power party, Yoon will almost certainly be replaced by a leftist president.

Leader of the opposition Lee Jae-myung is himself in the running for election before he runs out of appeals in court cases and becomes ineligible for the presidency. Whoever is elected president will have less domestic political room for harsh criticism of South Korea’s foreign policy.

Inevitably, the new South Korean president will write a new foreign policy strategy. South Korea’s national security and foreign policy strategies are produced by the presidential office, not the relevant ministries or the government as a whole.

As such, they are a statement of the president’s strategy and are subject to change, sometimes drastically, whenever a new president takes office. Some goals – an increasing defense exportsand better relations with Southeast Asia – have existed in administrations for several years and will likely survive the transition to Yoon’s successor. Others may not. But the global and regional strategic environment has changed, and while Lee Jae-myung has said in the past that he essentially wants to return to the status quo ante: softer line with North Korea, away from Japan, a balanced relationship with China and the USA, the principles of the traditional foreign policy goals of South Korean leftist presidents do not correspond to the new reality.

A new reality

Part of the damage to South Korea’s strategic position was due to Yoon’s actions. Ironically, Yoon Seok-yeol’s foreign policy strategies have relied heavily on South Korea’s economic development and democratic governance as elements of its soft power, and in pursuit of “free and open Indo-Pacific.”

The domestic reactions to Yoon’s declaration of martial law, the ill-fated relaxation of the military, the impeachment move and massive public demonstrations were predictable: almost instant mass protests are practically South Korea’s national pastime. To some extent, the swift reaction showed the strength of South Korean democracy, but the instability itself has overshadowed South Korea’s light abroad.

South Korea’s strategic environment is also becoming increasingly difficult to navigate. Traditionally, the relationship between North Korea and South Korea has been treated by both sides as a relationship between two warring halves of the nation, rather than as foreign adversaries. However, South Korea is now facing North Korea which officially considers South Korea a foreign countrywhich has physically destroyed the roads and buildings that represent the link between North and South, which has emphasized the continuous and irreversible development of its unconventional weapons capabilities, and which is disinterested in talks even though it cultivates a relationship with Russia that will allow blunt the force of sanctions.

Regardless of who becomes president, there is no going back to the rapprochement that Yoon’s predecessor, Moon Jae-in, sought.

In the wider region, South Korea treads in troubled waters. Russia is actively using North Korean troopsmissiles and artillery shells in its war with Ukraine, and China is not only not a strategic friend, but has become an economic competitor in many sectors. They will no longer help contain North Korea. The United States’ commitment to the defense of South Korea is strong, but its willingness and ability to maintain the overall Asian security architecture in which South Korea is embedded is wavering.

Japan, for its part, is postponing meetings with South Korean leaders until the political situation is clarified. Wherever the new president decides to go, the uncomfortable truth is that stronger strategic ties with Japan, both bilaterally and in the context of ties with the United States, are the logical answer to South Korea’s strategic conundrums. Post-Yoon South Korea will certainly want to discard Yoon Seok-yeol’s disastrous decisions, but it may be forced to pick up some of the pieces of his foreign policy based on this new reality.

Justin Hastings is a professor of international relations and comparative politics at the University of Sydney, where he is also head of the regional security program at the Center for International Security Studies. He is the author of several books and journal articles, including The Most Enterprising Country: North Korea in the Global Economy (Cornell University Press, 2016).

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