Japan-South Korea Relations Under Trump – The Diplomat

In the period between the inauguration of Yoon Suk-yeol as the President of South Korea in May 2022 and the startling events of this month, there has been a significant improvement in relations between Japan and South Korea. This contrasted with the severing of ties between the two nations under former South Korean President Moon Jae-in and then-Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo, when their respective administrations failed to manage the relationship.

Under Moon’s administration, South Korea’s justice system has ordered accused Japanese companies to pay compensation to former civilian workers from the Korean Peninsula. In response, the Yoon government offered a resolution under which a foundation under the South Korean government would make the payments on behalf of the companies. This was intended to harmonize the court’s decision with the 1965 Agreement on the Settlement of Property and Claims Problems and on Economic Cooperation between Japan and the Republic of Korea.

Japan’s prime minister at the time, Kishida Fumio, welcomed the proposal, leading to an unprecedented 12 summits between the leaders of the two nations. However, in South Korea, the decision drew strong criticism, with most of the public unhappy with Yoon’s attempt to solve the problem. Moreover, subsequent rulings have been made following Supreme Court precedent, with the result that the problem still exists.

Given the domestic criticism, why did the Yoon administration make such a decision in the first place? We should view the decision in the context of a major shift in the overall agenda of South Korean diplomacy.

First, there was a change in policy towards North Korea. Unlike the Moon administration, which focused on engagement, the Yoon administration used a policy that focused on deterrence. These policies respond to increasing the reliability of the US extended nuclear deterrent in response to North Korea’s nuclear missile development.

Second, there has been a shift in South Korea’s stance on Sino-US tensions. The Moon administration has adhered to a policy of “strategic ambiguity,” refusing to take sides. However, the Yoon administration decided to join the “Indo-Pacific Strategy”, a strategy promoted by Japan and the US in response to China.

Third, there has been a move towards strengthening the South Korean-American alliance. While the Moon administration has strengthened its alliances to gain support and cooperation from the US with its policy of engagement with North Korea, the Yoon administration has focused on a strengthened partnership in the global sphere, with the aim of improving the reliability of the extended nuclear deterrent. Consequently, while Moon’s diplomacy indicated a “Korean Peninsula-centric” stance, Yoon’s was focused on a “Global Key State”.

Upgrading Yoon’s diplomacy will require strengthening security cooperation with Japan and the US, which already share diplomatic goals. This would resolve the distrust between Japan and South Korea, which has hindered cooperation in the past. As a start, joint security cooperation between Japan, the US and South Korea led to the issuance of “Camp David principles” and “The spirit of Camp David” after a stand-alone trilateral summit in August 2023, as well as the establishment of a “Japan-US-ROK Trilateral Coordination Secretariat” in November 2024 to further enhance the framework for joint security cooperation between the three nations.

In Japan, the Kishida administration has now given way to the government of Ishiba Shigeru. With Ishiba holding the most liberal position among key policymakers in the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) on issues of historical awareness that have fueled tensions between Japan and South Korea, Seoul no longer had to worry about what the new Japanese prime minister might do. say or do. In return, it would normally be expected to help keep relations between the two countries on a favorable footing.

That is, at least until this month. After Yoon took the incredible step of briefly declaring martial law on December 3, the president was impeached by the National Assembly on December 14. He was forced to step down while under investigation on sedition charges. Prime Minister Han Duck-soo became acting president and will provide basic oversight of the country’s affairs.

If the Constitutional Court issues a ruling removing Yoon from office, there will likely be a political vacuum of at least three to four months until a new president is elected. Diplomacy at the top will actually stop. If there is a change of government and the opposition takes power, long-standing criticism of the Yoon administration’s policies toward Japan could lead to a reexamination of diplomacy with Japan, potentially complicating bilateral relations again. At the very least, the events of the past two weeks underscore the fragility of relations between Japan and South Korea, which have been heavily dependent on the Yoon administration.

Japan and South Korea will celebrate 60 years of normalized relations in 2025, but given the current situation, they will have difficulty making bold mutual compromises to change the status quo. The best that can be expected for now is to maintain the status quo.

The Sado gold mine was declared a world heritage site in cooperation with the Yoon administration. It was originally planned that the commemoration of the victims would be held in November, with the participation of official representatives of both countries. However, due to conflicting information, each country ended up having its own service, highlighting how thorny historical issues remain between Japan and South Korea.

Amid these problems, the world awaits the inauguration of the second administration of Donald Trump. What is most interesting is that during Trump’s previous time in office in Japan, US-Japan relations were generally considered good, while US-South Korea relations were shaky. However, in South Korea, and especially in the Moon administration, the opposite conclusion was drawn: South Korea’s ties with Washington were good, while US-Japan relations were problematic.

Unlike the Biden administration, which was instrumental in establishing joint security cooperation between the US, Japan and South Korea as a mediator between the two East Asian neighbors, Trump seems to think that the competition between Japan and South Korea over loyalty to the US is the latter’s benefit . A period of competition over US loyalty between Japan and South Korea may indeed be upon us. This makes it even more important for Japan to secure a line of communication with the Trump administration by further strengthening cooperation with South Korea. To achieve this, it is essential that Tokyo takes the initiative in addressing the next South Korean administration, wanting to build on the results the two countries have already achieved in this regard.