Drones in Ukraine: Four lessons for the West

Drones have become a central weapon of the Russian-Ukrainian war, with the number of unmanned systems—mostly airborne, but not exclusively—reaching staggering levels. In early 2024, Ukraine intended to produce a million drones within the year. In March, that goal was revised to two millionand in October, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced that the country is now capable of producing up to four million drones per year. It’s Russia allegedly corresponds to this pace of production. There are an estimated 100 different types of drones in use in Ukraine, ranging from toy-sized systems to larger models with wingspans of nearly 20 meters.

Intelligence gathering and strike operations, as well as targeted support of other military systems, are key functions of drones. But they also play different roles, such as serving as decoys (to mislead or exhaust enemy air defenses), act as signal relays, transport equipment, and lay mines. Both Ukraine and Russia are building these systems themselves, acquiring them from allies, or using modified civilian drones.

The nature of the war in Ukraine favored drones. He fights for the land. The manned aircraft were neutralized by anti-aircraft defense for a long time. Civilian drones are widely available, even if they’re not always the most effective option: a dedicated anti-tank weapon is usually better suited to attacking a tank than a drone with a first-person view. But when the first is not available, the second might be a good enough alternative. And with Ukraine grappling with a shortage of ammunition and military equipment for its artillery, drones have partially helped fill this void.

The number of non-air systems also increased significantly: Ukraine used naval drones (surface and underwater systems) to attack the Russian Black Sea fleet, resulting in sinking of several ships. Ukrainians want to create what they described as “the world’s first fleet of naval drones”. Unmanned ground systems also entered the battlefield. While they are still less sophisticated than their naval and air brothers and sisters, they are capable of transportation, intelligence gathering and even attackwith.

Western armed forces and governments can draw four lessons from Ukraine’s experience with drones.

First lesson: It won’t always be like Ukraine

Every armed force in today’s world is looking to utilize the capabilities of drones. Unlike just a few years ago, any state, as well as non-state actors, can readily acquire drones. Currently, the main exporters of military drones are China and Turkey. But drones can also be built domestically with relatively little resources and expertise. Meanwhile, civilian drones are freely available to anyone in large quantities. These systems can, within certain limits, be adapted to military operations. Of course, the modified civilian quadcopter bears little resemblance to the multi-million dollar unmanned warplane. But both have military benefits, and in some cases, mass production and low cost can compensate for the lack of advanced capabilities. Western armed forces should therefore prepare for future conflicts in which drones will be ubiquitous and used for various roles. They should be able to manage such systems as well as be able to defend against them.

However, Ukraine may just be the tipping point for drone warfare. The factors that made drones relevant in Ukraine may look different in future wars. The total number of drones could be lower if civilian drones cannot be used—due to weather conditions or greater distance, such as a naval conflict. Civilian drones may also not be as readily available in conflicts involving China, which manufactures almost all civilian systems (see lesson three below). Other weapon systems could be available, reducing the need for drones as replacements.

Russia and Ukraine play a game of cat and mouse, with rapid innovation cycles for both drone and anti-drone technologies

Defense against drones is another element of uncertainty: even in Ukraine, drones have become less useful in some areas due to counter-drones. Russia and Ukraine are playing a game of cat and mouse, with rapid innovation cycles for both UAVs and counter-drones. Often new technological developments only provide a temporary advantage before the other side adapts.

This means that one should be careful in extrapolating the scenario from Ukraine. To claim that the war in Ukraine demonstrated the dominance of small and cheap drones over larger, more sophisticated and expensive systems could be a dangerous misjudgment.

Lesson Two: Scale up and adapt quickly

A natural conclusion for Western armed forces could be the stockpiling of large quantities of equipment. Replenishment of depleted arsenals in Europe is certainly an urgent task. However, drones require a different approach.

Drone species can quickly lose their usefulness. If the combat situation changes, or if defenses are developed to counter them, a drone system that was vital yesterday may become obsolete today. During the initial attack on Ukraine, Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2 drones were so crucial in the fight against Russian troops that they inspired the popular war song. By 2024, the Bayraktars were no longer important, mainly due to air defense. The Bayraktars were not the only system to suffer this fate; it has become increasingly difficult to make a list of drones used in Ukraine due to their rapid turnover. Systems need to be adapted quickly.

Impressively fast innovation cycles—from cardboard airplanes and tethered aircraft on increased autonomy and using AI— is therefore not only the result of the ingenuity of Ukrainian, Russian and Western engineers. They are imperative to avoid defeat.

Therefore, if European states acquired some 100,000 quadcopter drones in 2023 – an approach that seemed reasonable at the time – it is very likely that these systems would now be largely useless. Instead, the European defense industry must be positioned to increase production and modify systems and processes as needed. The construction of modular systems with exchangeable components should be encouraged.

The third lesson: Dependence on China must be curbed

When the civilian drone market took off in the early 2010s, Chinese companies quickly dominated it. Their low prices pushed out Western competitors out of the market and by 2016, DJI had reckoned two thirds of all consumer drones produced worldwide. Today, Chinese companies hold a monopoly on the hobbyist market, offering highly capable systems at affordable prices. And not only does China make most of the commercial drones, it also makes most of the components needed to assemble them. As a result, while Ukraine is likely to emerge from the war as a drone power, its industry depends on Chinese-made parts — from cheap plastic components to engines and video transmitters.

This dependence is particularly worrisome in light of the growing geopolitical competition between the West and China, along with Chinese-Russian cooperation. There are complaints in Ukraine about faulty Chinese components, which has sparked rumors of sabotage. In the midst of a trade war with the US, China is now restricting exports components and materials key to making unmanned aerial vehicles, a move that is already affecting Ukraine. Kyiv recently started on land production of components, but it will be a long process and will require European support.

Policymakers have long known that China is outperforming European—and even American– military industry. China’s positioning on the war in Ukraine is already problematic; this would be even more worrisome in a military conflict involving the country. Europe must strengthen not only its defense industry, but also land-based production if it is not to be caught unable to produce even the basic systems needed in conflict.

Lesson Four: Drones Enable Greater Civilian Involvement

First-person videos of drones dropping shells into the open hatch of a tank or pursuing soldiers or guided to safety drone: these images were ubiquitous in the war, fostering a sense of intimacy with the public. This led many people, from Ukraine and abroad, to participate crowdfunding initiatives—many of which, astonishingly, targeted to buy drones.

Being cheap and easy to modify, drones have allowed civilians to be directly involved in defense efforts. volunteers started fiddling with drones since the Russian aggression in 2014. Drone unit for hobbyists Air reconnaissance developed its own drone system that was used by the Ukrainian army until 2022.

Growing involvement civilians in war is a phenomenon that Europeans have to contend with. This is an important challenge, especially for democracies. While engaged citizens can be a positive force, they can contribute to polarization, be exploited by adversaries, or create pressures that could disrupt international diplomacy.

Any lessons learned from the ongoing war should be carefully considered. But it can reveal vulnerabilities and major changes in warfare tactics. A war on European soil is a crucial moment and an opportunity for Europeans to learn the right lessons for their defense.