5 Factors That Catapulted Arakan Army to Unprecedented Success Against the Myanmar Military – The Diplomat

Of all the ethnic armed organizations operating in Myanmar, the Arakan Army has managed to bring under its control the largest expanse of territory in less than two decades since its formation. It has liberated as many as 13 townships from the military junta so far, covering a vast swathe in Arakan, a region that includes southern Chin State and Rakhine State, even as it seeks to wrest control over areas still under the control of the Myanmar military.

Formed in Kachin in 2009 by 26 functionaries, including Commander-in-Chief Twan Mrat Naing, with the assistance of the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), the Arakan Army (AA) started engaging in armed conflict with the military in northern Rakhine State in 2015. Fighting was intermittent for five years thereafter.

Then in November 2020, the AA entered into an informal ceasefire with the military. But hostilities resumed early in 2022. Another brittle ceasefire came into effect in November of that year. On November 13, 2023, the AA launched a full-scale offensive against the military which continues to date.

So, what underlies the AA’s achievements? In an interview with The Diplomat, Twan Mrat Naing said that in addition to learning from the failures of previous generations of Arakan fighters to liberate Arakan from Burmese rule, the AA’s leadership, its organizational capacity and alliances enabled it to build a robust movement led by AA and its political wing, the United League of Arakan (ULA).

Based on my observations and travel in the region, as well as discussions and interviews with AA and ULA functionaries, five factors seem to have contributed to the organization’s success against the military.

“Leadership Has Been the Clinching Factor”

In an interview with The Diplomat on June 30, political commissar of Mrauk U and adjoining areas of Kyauktaw and the senior-most member of the ULA, Oo Hla Saw, said that while “AA’s success can be attributed to many reasons, leadership is the clinching factor. This is apparent from the differences among the leadership of previous organizations in Arakan that were formed to liberate the region from Burmese rule. Besides, “AA has made the movement inclusive by engaging all communities, which the earlier groups did not. There is no discrimination on the basis of race or religion,” he said, adding that “this policy stemmed from a clear vision of nation building.”

AA and ULA functionaries explained to The Diplomat how the organization expanded. A roadmap was firmed up even before the training sessions began in Kachin. From 2009, four batches of AA functionaries comprising around 400 fighters rolled out from Kachin in a span of two years. The next phase of the plan involved stationing the trained cadres with the KIA to gain ground experience, and in the cities of Yangon, Sittwe and Mandalay to build a network.

Meanwhile, AA began to identify student leaders and monks in Arakan to build a network to attract recruits. From 2014, AA functionaries were infiltrated and settled in varied locations of Rakhine State. This coincided with a conference of Arakanese parties in Kyaukphyu where the AA leaders made their first public appearance in uniforms.

AA’s popularity surged thereafter, making it easier for it to build roots among the masses. In 2015, the AA fought its first major battle with the military at Yanchaung where it used guerrilla tactics to put the latter on the backfoot.

A colonel of AA who heads a regional command pointed out that the northern region of Arakan, including Paletwa and the area around Myanmar, India and Bangladesh trijunction in southern Chin State, was the organization’s focus during the initial phase of building a support base. “That region was selected because it was necessary to control the trade routes to and from India and Bangladesh. Besides, the military was weaker here than in the south,” he said. In 2015, the ULA was formed to set up an administrative apparatus in the region, and training camps were established a year later.

These efforts ran concurrently with AA’s covert endeavor to transport weapons to Arakan from different sources including Shan State. According to a 2024 report from the Centre for Arakan Studies, “AA leaders sent their troops group by group using all available channels from Kachin or Northern Shan state. Weapons and ammunition are also reported to move by land and water challenges via Thailand, India, or Bangladesh.”

As conflict with the military intensified, the AA leadership sensed the need for greater coordination and efficiency in executing operations. As many as nine military regional commands were created headed by colonels and lieutenant colonels and supervised by a war office at a secret location, where Twan Mrat Naing and his deputy Brigadier General Dr Nyo Twan Aung are assisted by a group of senior officers.

Alliances With Resistance Groups

The AA’s alliances with other resistance organizations across the country have also facilitated its expansion. Currently, AA troops are deployed in the states of Kayin, Shan and Kachin and in Sagaing Region and Magway Region.

It was in 2015 that the AA joined its first major alliance, the Northern Alliance, comprising the Tang National Liberation Army (TNLA), Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) and KIA, to participate in operations against the military in the Kokang war in northern Shan State. It joined the United Wa State Army (UWSA)-led Federal Political Negotiation and Consultative Committee (FPNCC) in April 2017, and two years later, it joined the MNDAA and TNLA in the Three Brotherhood Alliance, which in October 2023, launched Operation 1027 in northern Shan State, which is considered a turning point in the ongoing war against the military.

According to Zevago, a senior ULA officer, the alliances helped AA “gather resources and support, and learn the fighting skills and tactics from different groups.” The 2021 coup, he said, “threw up new challenges compelling the AA to finetune strategies and look out for more alliances.”

The AA has declined to associate itself formally with the National Unity Government (NUG), the government-in-exile formed after the coup by ousted lawmakers and parliamentarians. When asked to spell out the nature of the relationship with the NUG, the AA commander-in-chief said “We have our own vision, missions, and objectives. While we, the people of Arakan, are fighting for the liberation and construction of Arakan, we hope the people of Myanmar achieve their objectives as quickly as possible.”

Its cautious ties with the NUG notwithstanding, AA has provided training and weapons to the People’s Defense Force (PDFs) formed after the coup in Chin State, Magway Region, Sagaing Region and Ayeyarwady Region. Among these, the most potent alliance seems to be with a conglomerate of six groups in Chin State called the Chin Brotherhood Alliance (CBA). In a combined operation last June, the CBA seized Matupi from the military. Control over the town and the adjoining areas is considered vital by AA to maintain the supply lines of essential commodities from the Indian border state of Mizoram.

“Arakan Army’s Advantage is the Large Pool of Young and Committed Cadres”

Aung Kyaw Kyaw, the police chief of Buthidaung, who was among 55 police personnel captured by AA from Odde village in the township on May 18, shared his observations about the reasons for the AA’s successful capture of the township.

“The AA has proved itself as a capable organization,” Aung Kyaw Kyaw told me on June 23. “Its advantage is the large pool of young and committed cadres, who are willing to fight and die for Arakan,” he said, adding that “this is something that the Myanmar military lacks as the soldiers’ morale is low and they are demotivated.”

What are the other reasons behind AA’s phenomenal success against the military?” I asked him.

“It is apparent that AA has the support of the people. No strategy would be effective without support. The Myanmar military in alliance with Islamist terror outfits has been targeting civilians in the region and is perceived as an alien force that has occupied Arakan. The military should avoid targeting civilians in towns and villages,” Aung Kyaw Kyaw said.

“What is your view about the advances made by AA?” I asked. “Will the military be able to defend this region against AA?”

“AA has already occupied 80 percent of Arakan,” the police chief said. “If the momentum is sustained, then it will be able to occupy the entire region.”

An overwhelming majority of AA functionaries I interacted with across seven townships were in the age group of 20-30 years. Two colonels heading regional commands whom I interviewed and another officer posted in the deserted town of Pauktaw appeared to be in their late thirties.

Nobody below the age of 16 is enrolled in the AA. The health condition, educational qualifications and past conduct of a recruit are scrutinized before he is enrolled. Anybody older than 35 years is usually recommended for the ULA. Senior political activists with other parties have also been allowed to join the ULA.

Arakan’s population and social configuration provide the AA and ULA a large reservoir of recruits. Rakhine State covers 36,778 sq kilometers with an estimated population of 3.22 million, as per data gathered by the government in 2011. Unemployment is rampant with almost 78 percent of the populace living below the poverty line. It is not surprising that AA has never faced any scarcity of cadres at any point, nor has it resorted to forced recruitment like some other resistance groups in the country.

AA Has No Competitor in Arakan

Rivalry among resistance groups that have even led to clashes is visible in other regions of Myanmar. Last year at Kalay in Sagaing Region, I interviewed two functionaries of Chin Rifles who had disengaged from Kalay PDF owing to disagreement with the leadership. Two fighters were killed and several injured when rival outfits fought each other in an incident six months ago in Chin State.

There is no scope for such conflict in Arakan since there is no rival to AA among the majority Rakhine Buddhist community to campaign for self-determination of the region. CDF Paletwa is a small group active in southern Chin State with a support base mostly among the Chin community. A senior AA functionary at Paletwa told me that the relationship between the two groups was “cordial and cooperative.”

AA has strained ties with Rohingya terror outfits active in Buthidaung and Maungdaw townships, most of whose functionaries fled to Bangladesh after the region was liberated from the military.

When AA was preparing for expansion, there were rival armed groups in Arakan. The Arakan National Council, which was admitted as a member of the United Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC), an alliance of ethnic armed groups in 2011, is almost non-existent today.

The Arakan Liberation Party (ALP) and its armed wing the Arakan Liberation Army, which was accepted as a signatory to the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) of 2015 inked between the Myanmar government and eight groups, is split into two factions after the 2021 coup, with one faction opposing the coup and the other supporting the NCA. According to a colonel of AA, the ALA comprises no more than a hundred members who are based in Sittwe and actively collaborating with the junta.

It is evident that unlike previous Arakan organizations, AA and ULA have been able to capitalize on the deep-rooted grievances among the people to mobilize support. Their declarations of the “Way of Rakhita” and “Arakan Dream” in 2019, which encapsulated the goals of self-determination and restoration of sovereignty of the Arakanese people, struck a chord with the Arakan masses.

Advantage of Terrain

Col. Twan Yai, regional Commander of Alpha 2 military region, underscored the crucial role that the terrain in Arakan played in the AA’s successful campaigns against the military. In an interview at Rathedaung on June 28, he said: “We were born here (Arakan) and also grew up here. We have expertise and knowledge of the local terrain. There are no Rakhine officers in the Myanmar military. All the officers serving here are from outside this region.”

Arakan’s landscape is different from Myanmar’s other border regions. It is a long and narrow stretch of mostly flat terrain interspersed with rivers and streams, bordering Bangladesh on the west and India on the north. In such a topography, and with the deplorable conditions of the highways, the rivers are the lifelines of the populace. I observed big and medium-sized boats fitted with motors carrying merchandise and passengers all day along all the rivers.

Before the start of the war, AA put in place an efficient system for fast transportation of men and material along the rivers. In addition to speedboats that are kept in ready mode, the AA also requisitions boats from the locals. In contrast, the military’s facilities for movement in rivers are dismal. It has to depend on potholed highways. Consequently, its vehicles get stuck on roads, making soldiers vulnerable to ambushes.

The AA also benefits from an efficient system of communication it has built across the region. Offices of the AA and ULA have access to the internet (through satellite), satellite phones and walkie-talkies. Special transmitters are used for relaying sensitive information. In some places, where ULA functionaries face transmission challenges, as in Mrauk U and Minbya, for example, “some ULA members have been permanently stationed on mountain tops from where messages are relayed to other destinations,” deputy Political Commissar of the region Aung Zan Phru told The Diplomat.

Given its skillful use of advantages and efficient strategizing, it is likely that AA’s footprints will expand in the coming months to include more territories in the northern areas of Rakhine State. Observers have predicted that its goal of autonomy could be a real possibility. This will have a decisive impact not only in Myanmar but also in the wider geopolitics of Southeast Asia.